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Abstract
H.P. Stapp has proposed a number of demonstrations of a Bell-type
theorem which dispensed with an assumption of hidden variables, but
relied only upon locality together with an assumption that experimenters
can choose freely which of several incompatible observables to measure. In
recent papers his strategy has centered upon counterfactual conditionals.
Stapp’s paper in American Journal of Physics, 2004, replies to objections
raised against earlier expositions of this strategy and proposes a simplified
demonstration. The new demonstration is criticized, several subtleties in
the logic of counterfactuals are pointed out, and the proofs of J.S. Bell
and his followers are advocated.
1 Introduction
Henry Stapp’s article “A Bell-type theorem without hidden variables” [1] is a
reformulation of a project which has evolved over many years [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]
and has been the subject of numerous critical assessments, e.g., Clauser and
Shimony [9], Clifton, Butterfield, and Redhead [10], Clifton and Dickson [11],
Mermin [12], Unruh [13], Shimony and Stein [14, 15]. The last four of these crit-
icisms were directed specifically against Stapp [6]. Concerning these four criti-
cisms Stapp [1] states on column 1 of p. 32, “I have answered these objections.
However, the very existence of these challenges shows that the approach used
. . . has serious problems, which originate in the fact that it is based on classical
modal logic.” The purpose of the present paper is to assess carefully Stapp [1],
restating previous criticisms when his new language leaves the scientific and
philosophical theses of Stapp [6] essentially unchanged, but also acknowledging
and assessing innovations. Stapp’s seriousness and tenacity merit an attentive
examination of his latest exposition.
Stapp [1, 6] expresses dissatisfaction with the alleged demonstrations of J.S.
Bell [16, 17] and his followers [18] that the predictions of Quantum Mechan-
ics (QM) are inconsistent with the locality of the Special Theory of Relativity
(STR). All of these demonstrations examine the possibility of recovering the
predictions of QM by means of a local hidden-variables model, which assigns
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definite values to all the observable quantities recognized by QM even when
QM prohibits in principle their simultaneous measurability. In thus character-
izing the entire class of local hidden variables theories Stapp argues that the
difference between so-called “deterministic” and so-called “stochastic” theories
is superficial, because the latter are equivalent to the former except for errors
which tend to zero as the number of experiments goes to infinity; see espe-
cially Stapp [3]. Consequently, Stapp maintains, the demonstrations by Bell
and his followers prove only the inconsistency of QM with the conjunction of
locality, free choice of experiments, and the assumption of hidden variables, and
since the assumption of hidden variables violates the philosophical viewpoint of
QM, the conclusion reached by the standard derivations is neither surprising
nor profound. Stapp aims at a stronger theorem throughout his entire series
of investigations of the foundations of quantum mechanics: that QM is incon-
sistent with the conjunction of locality and the assumption that experimenters
freely choose among incompatible experiments performable in a given space-time
region, the latter being an assumption which he regards as implicit in the entire
enterprise of experimental science. I wish to assert, at the commencement of my
critical assessment, my agreement with Stapp that a successful demonstration
of the inconsistency of QM with locality and free choice, without the explicit or
implicit assumption of hidden variables, would indeed be a profound scientific
and philosophical achievement.
2 Stapp’s Explicit and Tacit Assumptions
The physical system S which Stapp envisages for analysis consists of two parts,
located in two space-time regions R and L, which have space-like separation
from each other. Einstein-Minkowski geometry, which is the geometry of the
space-time of the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) implies that there exists a
Lorentz frame F in which every point in L is earlier than every point in R, and
Stapp prefers to speak of R and L in the frame F whereas I prefer to express
the relation between R and L in a frame-invariant manner, even though the
same geometrical facts can be equivalently expressed in both ways. The part of
S located in L will be called λ, and the part located in R will be called ρ. λ is
subjected to one of two measurements, labeled L1 and L2, freely chosen by an
experimenter in L, while ρ is subjected to one of two experiments, labeled R1
and R2, freely chosen in R. Each measurement is bivalent, with possible results
labeled + and −. The expression “L1+” ambiguously designates the + result of
the measurement L1 or the proposition that the measurement L1 is performed
with outcome +; and “L1−”, “L2+”, and “L2−” have analogous meanings.
Context determines which of the possible meanings is intended. Likewise each
of R1 and R2 has bivalent outcomes + and −. Following L. Hardy [19] and
the slight modification by Eberhard and Rosselet [20] (the latter referred to
here henceforth as “HER”, but Stapp calls it “Hardy”), Stapp ascribes to the
composite system a quantum state which predicts the following correlations:
1. Upon the condition that L2 is performed, if R2+ then L2+.
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2. If R1 is performed and L2+, then R1−.
3. If R2 is performed and L1−, then R2+.
4. If R1 is performed and L1−, then R1 has a non-zero probability of having
outcome + and a non-zero probability of having outcome −. (Actually
HER choose these probabilities to be 50%, but I prefer not to work with
quantitative probabilities for reasons to be stated later.
Stapp considers probability to be a meaningful concept applicable to a single
system, like the system S, even though empirical evidence about probabilities
can be gathered only when one has an ensemble of similar systems, all prepared
in the same quantum state. In the analysis of counterfactual conditionals at the
heart of Stapp’s theorem a central concept is that of “possible worlds,” each
of which is a maximal characterization of a system S in terms of the experi-
ments that can be performed upon it and their possible outcomes, subject to
the constraints of internal consistency and obedience to general physical laws
and specific constitution. In the case of the extremely simple system S each can-
didate possible world is one of the following sixteen, each consisting of four bits
of information: (L1+, R1+). (L1+, R1−), (L1+, R2+), (L1+, R2−), (L1−,
R1+), (L1−, R1−) (L1−, R2+), (L1−, R2−), (L2+, R1+), (L2+, R1−), (L2+,
R2+), (L2+, R2−), (L2−, R1+), (L2−, R1−), (L2−, R2+), (L2−, R2−). The
qualification “candidate” is used because predictions (1), (2), and (3) have not
yet been applied to winnow out impossibilities from the foregoing list. The list
of candidates for possible worlds is similar to the set of state descriptions in the
works of Carnap [21], except that the quantum mechanical restrictions against
simultaneous performance of experiments R1 and R2 and simultaneous perfor-
mance of experiments L1 and L2 have limited the catalogue. Predictions (1)-(3)
of the HER model enforce the elimination of (L1−, R2−), (L2+, R1+), (L2−,
R2+) from the sixteen candidate possible worlds, leaving only thirteen possible
worlds : (L1+, R1+). (L1+, R1−), (L1+, R2+), (L1+, R2−), (L1−, R1+),
(L1−, R1−) (L1−, R2+), (L2+, R1−), (L2+, R2+), (L2+, R2−), (L2−, R1+),
(L2−, R1−), (L2−, R2−). There is quantitative information about probabil-
ities in prediction (4), information which does not restrict the set of possible
states for each system in the ensemble but only influences the statistics of their
actualization in the ensemble (each member of which is assigned its own pair
of space-like separated regions like the R and L assigned to S). The analysis of
counterfactual conditionals for a single system does not depend upon the quan-
titative probabilities but only upon the more primitive matter of possibility or
impossibility. Specifically, prediction (4) implies that (L1−, R1+) and (L1−,
R1−) are both possible worlds.
Finally I shall state two Auxiliary Assumptions which Stapp never makes
explicit but seems to be implicit in the HER quantum state and in his proof
of Property (II) (Stapp [1], second column of p. 31): (i) that the probability
of R2+ is greater than zero, given that R2 is chosen to be performed in R
and that either L1 or L2 is chosen to be performed in L; and (ii) that among
the ensemble of systems considered there are some in which L2 and R2 are the
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chosen experiments, with outcome + for R2, and some in which L1 and R2 are
the chosen experiments, with outcome − for R2. These assumptions guarantee
that in the actual world for the ensemble some systems have features which
allow Stapp’s Property (II) to be proved rigorously in Sect. 3, though—as will be
seen—the conjunction of Properties (I) and (II) does not suffice to complete the
proof of the theorem at which he is aiming. The assumptions are of a kind which
is commonplace in the construction of interesting quantum mechanical models.
It should be emphasized that Assumption (ii) is not a tautology unless quantum
mechanical probability is interpreted in a frequency sense, whereas a propensity
interpretation is convincingly proposed by Popper [22]) In practice, however,
Assumption (ii) is indispensable for the purpose of connecting probability in
the propensity sense to observable frequencies.
3 Stapp’s Theorem
The first stage in Stapp’s demonstration of the theorem stated in italics in the
last paragraph of Sect. 1 is a proof in column 2 of p. 32 of the quantum theoretical
Property (I) of the (HER) state: that if L2 is performed in an experiment of
this type then SR necessarily follows, where SR asserts, “If R2 is performed and
gives outcome +, then if, instead, R1 had been performed the outcome would
have been −.”
There are two troublesome expressions in the definition of SR, namely “if,
instead” and “would have been.” Stapp proposes a clarification of the first of
these expressions in the course of proving Property (I): “The concept ‘instead’
is given an unambiguous meaning by the combination of the premisses of ‘free
choice,’ and ‘no backward in time influence [NBITI]:’ the choice between R1 and
R2 is to be treated, within the theory, as a free variable, and switching between
R1 and R2 is required to leave any outcome in the earlier region L undisturbed.
But then statements (1) and (2) can be joined in tandem to give the result SR.”
(Stapp [1], column 2 of p. 31.)
The last sentence of this quotation is cryptic, but it is illuminated by the
discussion of “would have been” in column 1 of p. 32 of Stapp [1]. “The previous
argument rests heavily on the use of counterfactuals: the key statement SR
involves, in a situation in which R2 is performed and gives outcome +, the
idea ’if, instead, R1 had been performed. . . ’´ But then he says that Bell-type
hidden variables assumptions are also counterfactual, and he takes pains to
repeat that his assumptions are weaker than those of Bell and his followers.
Later on this page, in Section IV, he goes on to say that his earlier exposition
in Stapp [6] has been criticized, and that even though he has answered these
criticisms those challenges indicate there are serious problems in that exposition,
“which originate in the fact that it is based on classical modal logic.” That logic,
he says, has three drawbacks:
1. Although the symbolic proof is concise and austere, that brevity is based
on a background that most physicists lack, which means that most physi-
cists cannot fully understand it without a significant investment of time.
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2. The question arises as to whether the use of classical modal logic begs
the question by perhaps being based in implicit ways on the deterministic
notions of classical physics.
3. Classical modal logic itself is somewhat of an open question, and it is not
immediately clear to what extent these issues undermine the proof.
Drawback (1) should be disregarded for two reasons. One is the historical
fact that physicists have learned to use much more intricate mathematics than
modal logic when that turned out to be useful for physical problems. The other
is that the formal proof on p. 302 of Stapp [6] is in fact not concise and austere,
since its fourteen steps are susceptible to condensation—as shown in the first
paragraph on p. 850 of Shimony and Stein [14] and the second column of p. 31
of Stapp [1].
Drawback (2) is troublesome on first inspection, since classical modal logic
does rely upon causal analysis, and the shift from the deterministic laws of
classical physics to the indeterministic laws of QM would presumably require a
modification of causal analysis. However, an examination of Stapp’s proofs of
Property (I) and Property (II) shows that only special cases of quantum me-
chanical probabilities are used: impossibility and necessity in property (I), that
is to say, probability zero and unity, and necessity and intermediate probability
(neither zero nor unity) in property (II). The ubiquitous statistical character of
quantum mechanical predictions, permitting the entire range of probabilities,
has not been invoked.
Drawback (3) is not troublesome because of an important contribution by
Stapp himself. In the often-cited work on the logic of counterfactuals by D.
Lewis [23] there is indeed an open question: how to give a reasonable criterion
of the comparative closeness of possible worlds w′ and w′′ to actual world w, a
criterion that is needed to implement Lewis’s truth condition for a counterfactual
conditional proposition. The discussion in Lewis’s book sounds quite scholastic,
and one has a feeling that his entire program is endangered by the likelihood
that the question of comparative closeness is not well posed. Stapp cuts through
the question by proposing that a counterfactual conditional “if p were true, then
q would be true” is true if and only if q is true in every possible world w′ that
differs from the actual world w only by the consequences of the action described
by p; according to STR this condition means every possible world w′ in which p
is true and which agrees with w everywhere outside the future light-cone of the
set of space-time points where the experimenter’s action is localized (paraphrase
of paragraph 5 in column 1 on p. 855 of Stapp [8]); also Shimony and Stein [15],
paragraph 2 on p. 502). A clear criterion from STR has thus replaced the elusive
criterion of “closeness” of one world to another. Stapp has thus admirably solved
the problem that has made him wary, in drawback (3), of using classical modal
logic.
With these clarifications of counterfactual conditional propositions we can
prove Stapp’s Property (I), which asserts (in column 2 of p. 31 of Stapp [1]),
“if an experiment of the Hardy-type is performed then L2 implies SR, where
SR = ‘If R2 is performed and gives outcome +, then if instead R1 had been
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performed the outcome would have been −’.” This conclusion is correct even
if “implies” is taken in its strongest sense, the sense of strict implication (i.e.,
“p strictly implies q” is true if and only if in every possible world in which p is
true q is also true). The possible worlds, as stated in Section 2, are maximal
characterizations of the system S consistent with each each other and with the
obedience by S of the general laws of physics (the relevant ones being the laws
of quantum mechanics) and the specific constitution of S (the HER state): The
antecedent of the implication asserted by property (I) is that L2 is performed in
L, which is a premiss that picks out six of the thirteen possible worlds : (L2+,
R1−), (L2+, R2+), (L2+, R2−), (L2−, R1+), (L2−, R1−), (L2−, R2−). The
antecedent of SR is false in all of these except (L2+, R2+), and therefore SR
itself is trivially true in these five cases by the logic of material implication. But
in the case of the world (L2+, R2+) the consequent of SR is true, since the only
possible world in which R1 is performed instead of R2 and which is in agreement
with the part of (L2+, R2+) in region L is (L2+, R1−). Hence SR is true in all
possible worlds in which L2 is performed, ensuring the truth of Property (I).
The second stage in Stapp’s demonstration of the theorem stated in Sect. 1
is to prove Property (II), which asserts, “Quantum theory predicts that if an
experiment of the Hardy-type is performed then ‘L1 implies SR’ is false.” This
assertion is correct if “implies” is interpreted in the sense of strict implication.
The premisses of Property (II) are the correctness of quantum mechanics, the
HER characterization of S, and the performance of L1 on λ. By Assumption (ii)
there are members of the ensemble in which L1 is actually performed. One must
check that SR holds of the part in R of any such member. If R2 is either not
performed on the part of the system in R or is performed with outcome—then
SR is trivially true by the logic of material implication, because its antecedent is
false. On the other hand, if in the actual world R2 is performed on this system
with outcome +, then SR is true of the system if and only if the consequent of SR
is true, i.e., if and only if R1 has outcome—in all possible worlds in which R1 is
performed on the part of this system in R but which agree with the actual world
outside the forward light cone of R, in particular in region L. By Assumption
(ii) there are systems in the ensemble for which L1 is actually performed on
the members in L with outcome—while experiment R2 is freely chosen to be
performed on the corresponding systems in R By prediction (3) R2 has outcome
+ for these systems, thus guaranteeing the truth of the antecedent of SR. By
prediction (4) in each possible world in which R1 is performed instead of R2
for the systems just mentioned there is a non-zero probability that the outcome
will be R1+. Hence (L1−, R1+) is a possible world. Consequently there is a
case in which the consequent of SR is false even though the antecedent of SR is
true. Hence we have proved that there is a case in which L1 is the experiment
chosen in L but SR is false, thus establishing Property (II).
Stapp then combines Properties (I) and (II) to conclude that the free choice
between L1 and L2 has a causal relation to the truth of the proposition SR.
He claims that “in any theory or model in which the three assumptions (free
choice, NBITI, certain predictions of quantum theory ) are valid, the statement
SR must always be true if the free choice in region L is L2, but must sometimes
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be false if that free choice in L is L1. But the truth or falsity of SR is defined
by conditions on the truth or falsity of statements describing possible events
located in region R. The fact that the truth of S depends in this way on a
free choice made in region L, which is space-like-separated from region R, can
reasonably be said to represent the existence within the theory or model of some
sort of faster-than-light influence.” (Stapp [1], bottom of p. 31, top of p. 32.)
The error in Stapp’s argument is his claim that SR is a statement about re-
gion R alone. To be sure, the only events mentioned explicitly in SR are choices
between experiments in R and outcomes of the chosen experiments. But SR is
not simply a statement about actually occurring events. It is a counterfactual
conditional, and its truth condition is (by substituting in the italicized passage
in Sect. 2) the following: R1− is true in every possible world w′ that differs
from the actual world w only by the consequences of the action described by R1;
according to STR this means every possible world w′ in which R1 is true and
which agrees with w everywhere outside the forward light-cone of R. The phrase
“outside the forward light-cone of R” applies to L because of the assumption
that R and L are space-like separated. Hence SR does refer to parts of space-
time outside the region R. And once this characteristic of SR is recognized one
sees immediately that the choice between L1 and L2 in region L is not a super-
luminal cause of an effect in the space-like separated region R, causing SR to
be true if the latter choice is made and SR to be false if the former choice is
made. SR is an intricate proposition involving three different kinds of entities:
events in R, namely the actual choice between experiments R1 and R2 for ρ and
the outcome of the chosen experiment; events in L, namely the actual choice
between performing experiment L1 or L2 on λ and the outcome of the chosen
experiment; and a set of possible worlds satisfying the requirements spelled out
in the truth condition for the counterfactual conditional that constitutes the
consequent of SR, this set being an entity determined jointly by the aforemen-
tioned events in L and the aforementioned events in R. Stapp’s assertion that
SR is localized in region R is clearly incompatible with the intricacy of SR.
An answer to the foregoing argument is given in Stapp [8], p. 857, column
2, paragraph 2: “My input-output analysis makes the following point: The fact
that (1), the truth or falsity of this statement SR is, for any fixed choice made
by the experimenter in L, determined explicitly by whether or not a certain
conceivable event, R1−, must occur inR under conditions defined in R, coupled
with the agreed-upon fact that (2) the truth of SR depends upon which choice
is made by the experimenter in L, means that whether or not this conceivable
event in R must occur depends upon which choice is made by the experimenter
in L.” Stapp misstates the conditions under which SR is true or false. They
are indeed determined by whether or not a certain conceivable event, R1−,
must occur in R under certain conditions, but it is not the case that these are
“conditions defined in R.” Yes, two of the conditions are indeed defined in R:
the actual performance of R2 with outcome +, and the restriction of relevant
possible worlds in which the outcome R1− is required to those in which R1 is
performed instead of R2; but the further restriction upon the relevant
possible worlds, that they agree with the actual world outside the
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forward light-cone of R, is not a condition defined in R, because the
region in which agreement is enforced includes L.
An analogy may provide some relief from the logical complexity of the pre-
ceding paragraph. Some properties can be attributed to a local region R of
space-time intrinsically, without any reference to other space-time regions. Oth-
ers, however, cannot be attributed intrinsically. For instance, a comparative or
superlative property p like “locus of the fastest hundred meter free-style swim”
cannot be attributed to R without making a comparison with other regions.
Indeed, if the choice is freely made to schedule a hundred meter free-style swim-
ming match in a region R′ in the forward light-cone of R and the outcome is a
world’s record, then p will not hold of R, but it cannot be (note NBITI) that an
event in R′ is the cause of an event in R. This remark, of course, is a banality.
But some sophistication and reflection is required in order to understand that a
modal property like SR has a relational character just as much as the manifestly
superlative property p.
4 Conclusion
We can now see the virtue of the demonstrations of Bell’s theorem offered by
Bell [16, 17] himself and by his followers [18], which assume a hidden-variables
model as a premiss. Such a model—as Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen [24]
understood—explains correlations between regions R and L by means of at-
tributions of intrinsic properties (their “elements of physical reality”) to each
region. Consequently the correlations cannot be dismissed as banalities stem-
ming from the relational character of the attributed properties. The premisses of
demonstrations offered by Bell and his followers are indeed stronger than those
offered by Stapp, but the reward of the stronger premisses is a logically impec-
cable conclusion that certain experimentally demonstrated quantum mechanical
correlations violate relativistic locality.
In column 2 of p. 32 of Stapp [1] one finds an interesting historical remark,
“The EPR argument rests strongly on counterfactual ideas.” This statement is
widely held, and I myself believed for a long time (Shimony [25]) that a com-
mitment to counterfactual reasoning is a corollary of EPR’s physical realism.
Recently, however, I have been convinced by an old thesis of d’Espagnat [26]
that EPR could reach their conclusions by ordinary inductive logic, without any
invocation of counterfactual conditionals. Shimony [27] presents an elaboration
of d’Espagnat’s position and argues, in addition, that EPR’s “elements of physi-
cal reality” would suffice to provide a grounding for counterfactual conditionals.
Of course, the preceding sentence is itself conditional, and it is undermined
by Bell’s theorem and the related experiments. These throw doubt on the as-
sumption of relativistic locality needed by EPR to reach their conclusion that
there exist independent but correlated elements of physical reality in spacelike
separated regions.
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